## SECOND TEST. ECON 235, FALL 2013. NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

Answer in the space provided. Show correct work for full credit. Box your final answers.

**1. Monopsony.** My sweatpants-making company, JamesCorp, has a marginal revenue product of labor function  $MRP_L = 30 - \frac{1}{3}L$ , and faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve defined by the marginal cost of labor function  $MC_L = 6 + \frac{1}{3}L$ , where *L* is the number of people I employ. I have to pay all of my workers the same hourly wage (*w*), or they'll all revolt against me.

a) In order to maximize my profit, I should offer a wage of  $w = \_$ \_\_\_\_ and hire  $L = \_$ \_\_\_\_\_ people. In this case, my firm surplus is  $FS = \_$ \_\_\_\_, and the workers' surplus is  $WS = \_$ \_\_\_\_, so the total economic surplus is  $TES = \_$ \_\_\_\_.



c) If there were a minimum wage of  $\overline{w} = 18$  per hour, it would be profit-maximizing for me to offer a wage of 18 and hire L = \_\_\_\_\_\_ people. In this case, my firm surplus would be \_\_\_\_\_\_, and the workers' surplus would be \_\_\_\_\_\_, so the total economic surplus would be \_\_\_\_\_\_.

d) If there were a minimum wage of  $\overline{w} = 24$  per hour, it would be profit-maximizing for me to offer a wage of 24 and hire L = \_\_\_\_\_\_ people. In this case, my firm surplus would be \_\_\_\_\_\_, and the workers' surplus would be \_\_\_\_\_\_, so the total economic surplus would be \_\_\_\_\_\_. 2. The life cycle and labor supply. Suppose that my life can be divided into two distinct time periods, period 1 and period 2. Defining  $e_1$  as leisure in period 1,  $e_2$  as leisure in period 2, and c as total lifetime consumption, my preferences can be represented by the utility function  $U = e_1 e_2 c^3$ . Suppose a simple budget constraint of  $c = (1 - e_1)w_1 + (1 - e_2)w_2 + k$ , where  $w_1$  is my wage rate in period 2, and k is my non-labor income.

a) Find the functions  $c(w_1, w_2, k)$ ,  $e_1(w_1, w_2, k)$ , and  $e_2(w_1, w_2, k)$ , which give my optimal consumption, period 1 leisure, and period 2 leisure, as they depend on both wage rates and non-labor income. Don't forget to box your final answers here.

b) Explain how you reached the answer above, and why your approach makes sense.

**b**) Find my optimal  $e_1$ ,  $e_2$ , and c if  $w_1 = 100$ ,  $w_2 = 50$ , and k = 0.

c) In which time period do I work more? Explain why this is intuitive.

**d**) Explain the income and substitution effects of an increase in  $w_1$  on my optimal  $e_1$ ,  $e_2$ , and c.

e) Explain the income and substitution effects of an increase in k on my optimal  $e_1$ ,  $e_2$ , and c.

**3. Supply of risky labor.** I have the (expected) utility function  $U = w - 10r^{3/2}$ , where *w* is the wage I receive, and *r* indicates the level of workplace risk I experience. I work for one of many perfectly competitive firms that have the per-worker profit function  $\Pi = 120r^{1/2} + 100 - w$ . Since these firms are perfectly competitive, they pay me a wage such that they make zero profit from hiring me, and I can choose my level of workplace risk.

a) Find my wage as a function of workplace risk.

**b**) Find the level of workplace risk I would choose to maximize my expected utility.

c) If I choose the risk level from part (b), find my wage w and utility U.

**d**) With *r* on the horizontal axis and *w* on the vertical axis, sketch the firm's isoprofit curve and my indifference curve at the agreed-on wage-risk combination, to the right here  $\rightarrow$ 

d) Find my new wage and expected utility if the government makes it illegal for any workplace to have a risk level above  $\bar{r} = 1$ , but everything else remains the same as above.

e) Identify two strong assumptions in this model (as developed in chapter 8 of the Ehrenberg-Smith text), and explain why dropping each assumption could lead to different conclusions about the wisdom of workplace safety regulations.

**4. Comparative advantage.** Pat and Chris are partners. In a given hour, Pat can either make \$24 at work, or do 12 chores around the house. Likewise, Chris can either make \$16 at work, or do 4 chores around the house.

a) Who has an absolute advantage in what?

**b**) Who has a comparative advantage in what?

c) What trades of money for household chores might be mutually beneficial for Pat and Chris?

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