## SECOND TEST. ECON 100C, FALL 2015. NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

Fill in the blanks, and answer in the spaces provided. Show your work.

**1. Monopoly.** I took a photograph of a chicken, so I have the monopoly on selling it in poster form. I must sell all of the posters at the same price. Demand for my chicken posters is defined by the marginal benefit schedule given in the second column below. Each poster costs \$15 to produce.

**a**) Fill in the columns for total revenue (R) and marginal revenue (MR).

b) To maximize my profit, I should sell a quantity of \_\_\_\_\_\_ posters, at a price of \_\_\_\_\_. At this quantity and price, consumer surplus will be \_\_\_\_\_. When added to my producer surplus of \_\_\_\_\_, this gives a total economic surplus of \_\_\_\_\_.

c) If I lost my copyright, so that anyone could make and sell posters of my chicken photo for a cost of \$15 each, the equilibrium price would be \_\_\_\_\_, the equilibrium quantity would be \_\_\_\_\_, consumer surplus would be \_\_\_\_\_, producer surplus would be \_\_\_\_\_, and total economic surplus would be \_\_\_\_\_.

**d**) Draw the marginal benefit (MB), marginal revenue (MR), and marginal cost (MC) functions in the blank graph below. Shade in the area corresponding to the deadweight loss caused by my being a monopolist rather than a group of perfectly competitive firms.

q	MB	R	MR
1	80		
2	70		
3	60		
4	50		
5	40		
6	30		
7	20		
8	10		
9	0		

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2. Public goods Six roommates are deciding how much gunpowder to buy for the defense of their dorm suite. Each individual has the marginal benefit function  $MB_i = 10 - \frac{1}{2}y$ , where y is the quantity of gunpowder they buy, in pounds. The marginal cost of gunpowder is MC = 6.

a) If there is no possibility of collective action, and each person must decide privately how much gunpowder to purchase, then the equilibrium amount of gunpowder will be  $y^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_, and total economic surplus will be  $TES(y^*) =$ \_\_\_\_\_.

**b)** However, the socially optimal quantity of gunpowder is  $y^o =$ \_\_\_\_\_, which gives a total economic surplus of  $TES(y^o) =$ \_\_\_\_\_. Thus, the amount of surplus that can be gained through collective action is \_\_\_\_\_.

c) On both graphs below, draw the  $MB_i$ , MSB, and MC. On the left graph, mark  $y^*$ , and shade in the area representing  $TES(y^*)$ . On the right graph, mark  $y^o$ , and shade in the area representing  $TES(y^o)$ .



**3. Positive externality.** Suppose the market for a certain good (e.g. 'education') is perfectly competitive, but that the good causes a *positive* externality. Marginal private benefit, marginal private cost, and marginal external benefit are given by the functions below:

$$MB = 10 - \frac{1}{4}q$$
  $MC = 4 + \frac{1}{4}q$   $MEB = 2$ 

**a**) **No policy.** Given that there is no policy to address the externality, find the equilibrium quantity, price, consumer surplus, producer surplus, external benefit, and total economic surplus.

$$q^* = \_ \_ p^* = \_ CS^* = \_$$
  
 $PS^* = \_ EB^* = \_ TES^* = \_$ 

**b) Pigovian subsidy.** To maximize total economic surplus, the government should grant a subsidy of  $\sigma^o =$  \_\_\_\_\_ per unit to the consumers. Given this, find the equilibrium quantity, price, consumer surplus, producer surplus, external benefit, government expenditure, and total economic surplus.

$$q^{o} =$$
  $p^{o} =$   $CS^{o} =$   $CS^{o} =$   $PS^{o} =$   $EB^{o} =$   $GE^{o} =$   $TES^{o} =$   $TES^{o} =$ 

c) Graphing. On the left, graph the market without intervention, labeling  $CS^*$ ,  $PS^*$ ,  $EB^*$ , and DWL. On the right, graph the market with the subsidy, labeling  $CS^o$ ,  $PS^o$ ,  $EB^o$ , and  $GE^o$ .



## 4. Reflection questions

a) In Problem 1 above, explain as clearly as you can why the monopolist's marginal revenue from selling the fourth poster (MR) is strictly less than what the fourth person is willing to pay (MB). See if you can account precisely for the specific numerical difference between the two values.

**b**) In Problem 3 above, who is made better off by the Pigovian subsidy? By how much are they made better off, altogether?

c) Who is made worse off by the Pigovian subsidy? By how much?

**d**) Which is greater: the sum of the gains by those made better off, or the sum of the losses by those made worse off?

e) Explain in general, simple language (defining any terms you use) why markets will not reliably reach efficient outcomes with respect to the provision of goods that are non-rival and non-excludable.