## Problem set 2, due Monday, 9/30/13

1. Excludable public good / natural monopoly – non-rival but excludable. The town of Blacksburg wants to build a wax sculpture museum, to benefit mankind. The fixed cost of building the museum is \$7,000, but once it is built, the marginal cost of an extra visit is zero. Demand for museum visits is given by the marginal benefit function  $MB = 80 - \frac{1}{10}q$ , where q is the number of visits.

a) If the museum is run as a profit-maximizing, monopolistic company, what will it charge museum-goers for each visit?  $p_m^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_ At this price, there will be  $q_m^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_ visits, consumer surplus will be  $CS_m^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_, producer surplus will be  $PS_m^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_.

**b**) Suppose that the government lets everyone into the museum for free, and finances the building cost using tax revenue. The number of museum visits will be  $q_{mcp}^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_, and consumer surplus will be  $CS_{mcp}^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_. If there is no deadweight loss associated with raising the extra tax revenue, then total economic surplus is  $TES_{mcp,1}^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_.

On the other hand, if each dollar of tax revenue used to finance the museum causes  $50\phi$  of deadweight loss, then the total economic surplus generated by the museum project, net of this deadweight loss, is  $TES_{mcp,2}^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_.

c) What if, instead of financing the museum with tax revenue, the government decides to charge an admission price equal to average cost (F/q). The Pareto-dominant market-clearing quantity that satisfies this constraint is  $q_{acp}^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_, and the corresponding market price is  $p_{acp}^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_. The resulting consumer surplus is  $CS_{acp}^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_, the producer surplus is  $PS_{acp}^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_, and the total economic surplus is  $TES_{acp}^* =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_. 2. Clarke tax. There are five individuals who wish to use a Clarke voting mechanism to chose among three options: A, B, and C. Sincere utilities (in dollar amounts) for the different options are given in the first table below. Assuming that everyone votes these sincere utilities, which option will be chosen? \_\_\_\_\_ Use the table in the middle as an intermediate step toward filling in the tax table on the right.



Explain how voters 3 and 4 can game the system, if the remaining voters express their sincere preferences.